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INTRODUCTION 
What drives judges to grant or d eny standing, specifically taxpayer 
standing under the Establishment Clause, as they do? Perhaps judges are 
motivated by a deep reverence for the separation of powers, and see con-
stitutional and prudential standing as a straightjacket to keep courts with-
in their own sphere of authority.1 Perhaps courts handcuff themselves to 
 
 * Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School; Yale University (J.D ., B.A.); Oxford Uni-
versity (B.C.L.); Harvard University (LL.M.). These reflections were prepared for a Symposium at the 
Duquesne University School of L aw held on Novem ber 3, 2011, on the subject of “T he Future of the 
Establishment Clause in Context: Neutrality, Religion, or Avoidance?” I am grateful to Bruce Ledewitz 
for his kind in vitation to offer my thoughts on the topic of taxpayer standing under the Establishment 
Clause, and for the honor of sitting alongside the distinguished group of panelists he convened for this 
important event. For their comments and criticisms in the course of our Sy mposium, I am pleased to 
thank my fellow panelists and the engaged audience in  attendance. It also gives me great pleasure to 
thank Sean Baird, K. Adam Kunst, and Evan Williams for their suggestions in developing the ideas in 
this paper. 
 1. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 341 ( 2006); Allen v.  Wright, 468 
U.S. 737, 752 (1984); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separa-
tion of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881 (1983). 
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the rules of standing so as to protect the integrity of the border separating 
law from politics, recognizing that permissive standing rules create vast 
space for courts to engage in deliberations that more closely approximate 
the legislative function than the judicial one.2 Or maybe it is the good-faith 
intention to begin from neutral principles in order to ultimately reach the 
right jurisprudential result.3 We can posit each of these as the answer, or at 
least part of the answer. 
But perhaps the real answer is even more simple, and indeed more 
troubling, than we might suppose. The Court’s taxpayer standing rules 
under the Establishment Clause have pressed Pamela Karlan to ask how 
long the Court will continue to “manipulate standing rules to privilege 
claims it values . . . and to defeat claims it dislikes.”4 Justice Brennan 
himself advanced a similar line of argument quite forcefully while sit-
ting in the minority. He argued that the Court’s hostility to the Fram-
ers’ understanding of the Establishment Clause, as well as to the 
Court’s enforcement of that understanding, had led the Court to deny 
standing as a way to “vent[] that hostility under the guise of standing, ‘to 
slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who as the Framers intended 
are entitled to full consideration of their Establishment Clause claims on 
the merits.’”5 We should therefore consider the possibility that judges 
have misused the standing doctrine,6 such that judicial decision-making 
on taxpayer standing is motivated by nothing more than “naked politics.”7 
Could the standing doctrine be merely a smokescreen that conceals the 
political preferences of judicial actors? One recent study answered the 
question in the affirmative, concluding that “judges provide access to the 
courts to individuals who seek to further the political and ideological agen-
das of judges.”8 
 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 
U.S. 886, 888–89, 893 (1970). 
 3. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s 
Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 
454 (1994). 
 4. Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Horning, Shell Games, and E nforcing Constitutional Rights in the 
Twenty-First Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 882 (2010). 
 5. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 513 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in result and dissenting)). 
 6. Michelle M. Huhnke, Standing and the F irst Amendment: A P reenforcement Challenge to 
Child Pornography Forfeiture Laws, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1689, 1690 (1993). 
 7. Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of Acceptable Arguments, 
47 EMORY L.J. 89, 149 n.310 (1998). 
 8. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742–43 (1999). 
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The charge, then, is both devastating and direct: that the Court 
chooses whether to grant or deny standing according to what will serve the 
ideological interests of the governing judicial majority.9 The Court, we 
are told, manipulates the standing doctrine in order to make or avoid 
substantive judgments,10 much like the Court is seen as having done in the 
Burger era to align its rulings with the ascendant conservative strand of 
constitutional law.11 On Mark Tushnet’s analysis, “the Court finds stand-
ing when it wishes to sustain a claim on the merits and denies standing 
when the claim would be rejected were the merits reached.”12 In this way, 
the Court has deployed standing as a Bickellian passive virtue,13 a de-
vice that allows the Court either to sidestep matters of moral controver-
sy or to grab hold of ones it wishes to engage. Whatever the Court’s 
motivation for granting or denying taxpayer standing under the Establish-
ment Clause, Bruce Ledewitz is right to obs erve that the Court’s estab-
lishment case law is a collection of many missed opportunities to engage 
in “genuine judicial statesmanship.”14 
In these brief reflections, I explore the connection among the found-
ing design of the Establishment Clause, its modern interpretation and re-
interpretation, and the doctrine of taxpayer standing. I argue that the crea-
tion and evisceration of the taxpayer standing doctrine under the Estab-
lishment Clause is the bridge that connects the Clause’s founding design 
with its modern incarnation, rendering the two more similar than we 
might suppose. I begin with the colonial era and the e arly years of th e 
American republic, examining the intensity of religious faith at the found-
ing, which manifested itself in a pervasive culture of religious establish-
ment even after the adoption of the Bill of Rights. State establishments of 
religion abounded, as did religious tests and restrictions. But the eventu-
 
 9. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve  Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
159, 171 (2011); Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in Quantifying the Quali-
tative, 74 TENN. L. REV. 567, 580–81 (2007); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 73, 126 (2007); Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 GEO. L.J. 317, 347–48 (2004); Nancy C. 
Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 613–14 (2004); William W. Buzbee, Standing and 
the Statutory Universe , 11 D UKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 249 (2001); Patrick Lloyd Proctor, No 
Generalized Grievances: The “Law of Rules” Approach to Standing, 19 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 927, 945–
46 (1993); Peter H.A. Lehner, Judicial Review of Administrative Inaction, 83 COLUM. L. REV.  627, 648 
n.134 (1983). 
 10. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Co urt 1981 Term—Foreword: Public La w Litigation and the 
Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14–24 (1982). 
 11. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on  Allen v.  Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
635, 635 (1985). 
 12. Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 
663, 664 (1977). 
 13. David J. Weiner, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205, 227 (2001). 
 14. BRUCE LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM 144 (2011). 
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al move toward disestablishment in the several states ultimately spurred 
federal courts to create the taxpayer standing doctrine to conform Ameri-
can constitutional law to the new reality in the United States: that the mod-
ern premise had shifted away from religious establishment and the fusion 
of church with state toward pluralist democracy and the separation of reli-
gion from government. 
I subsequently trace the development and demise of the taxpayer 
standing doctrine. Its emergence is attributable to the same forces that have 
since quickened its decline: the impulse to recognize the specialness of 
religion and to grant a measure of autonomy in the choice to adhere, or not, 
to religion. Courts were concerned that the effect of compelling a non-
adherent to support a religion, or religion period, would be to ascribe to 
her beliefs that are not necessarily her own. In a good-faith effort to 
establish a sanctuary for citizens and their beliefs, courts therefore 
carved out a permissive exception for taxpayer standing from the custom-
arily uncompromising rules of federal standing. The consequence of en-
forcing these new rules governing taxpayer standing under the 
Establishment Clause was to localize religious beliefs within the indi-
vidual and away from the several states, where it had been anchored at the 
founding. 
Yet more recently, as I later demonstrate, the taxpayer standing doc-
trine has come under pressure. It is now on the brink of falling into 
desuetude. The modern decline of t axpayer standing has curiously de-
rived from the same heightened solicitude for religion, recognizing that 
religion is special, and that the federal government should keep its hands 
off. The result of this erosion of taxpayer standing has likewise been to 
localize religion, though not exclusively within the individual. As I will 
argue in the pages to follow, the regulation of religion and religious 
belief are increasingly becoming localized within the several states. The 
rise and recent erosion of taxpayer standing therefore have a similar impe-
tus and product. The implications of the argument I advance in these pages 
are more provocative still: the collapse of taxpayer standing could actually 
have the consequence of returning the republic to the founding design of 
the Establishment Clause. 
I. RELIGION AND THE STATE 
Whether the state should stand separate from religion, or integrate 
itself with it, is a deeply contentious question of constitutional design. 
It is in m any ways the first and most difficult choice constitutional 
designers must make before moving on to delineate the other dimensions 
DRAFT 07 - Albert (Publish) 4/27/2012  8:58 AM 
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of the sta te’s power and its relationship with citizens. Though many may 
presuppose that Church and State should be separate, separation is not a 
necessary condition of liberal democracy.15 We should therefore not be 
surprised to see many variations on Church-State religions across the 
globe. And we have. Some countries have adopted a fiercely separationist 
approach, mandating an uncompromising division of religion from gov-
ernment.16 Others have chosen the contrary approach, enthusiastically 
merging religion into the state such that there may no longer be a discern-
ible distinction between their respective spheres of influence.17 But the 
American experience has been unique. It has exhibited both separationist 
and integrationist characteristics in its lived history. What is more, the 
relationship between Church and State is today much different from what it 
was at the founding, and it may yet evolve again. 
A. Faith at the Founding 
Early Americans were intensely religious. Though the colonists who 
had left the Old World in search of a new one ultimately found religious 
refuge in what would become America,18 their first actions were to estab-
lish deep bonds between religion and government in their respective col-
onies. Most of the early colonies adopted an official religion to which their 
inhabitants were committed just as intensely as those who had driven them 
from England had been committed to their own faith.19 Importantly, the 
colonies identified with different religions and therefore reflected different 
religious affiliations.20 Religious diversity among the colonies was there-
fore the norm, but religious diversity within the colonies remained un-
common.21 The point, though, is clear: at the founding, religious 
 
 15. See Kent Greenawalt, Grounds for Political Judgment: The Status of Personal Experience and 
the Autonomy and Generality of Principles of Restraint, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 647, 672–73 (1993). 
 16. See, e.g., 1958 L A CONSTITUTION art. I (F r.); CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA 
[CONSTITUTION] Apr. 25, 1974, art. 288(c) (Port.); TÜRKÍYE CUMHURÍYETÍ ANAYASASI 
[CONSTITUTION] NOV. 7, 1982, art. 2 (Turk.). 
 17. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION  OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 26, 2004, art. 
149 (Afg.); CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIR Nov. 28, 
1996, art. 178(3) (Alg.); QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF T HE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 12 [1980] (Iran). 
 18. Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and t he Politics of Citizen Inter-
pretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 933 (1995). 
 19. MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN T HE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 35 
(1992). 
 20. LOREN P. BETH, THE AMERICAN THEORY OF CHURCH AND STATE 59–60 (1958). 
 21. CLIFTON E. OLMSTEAD, RELIGION IN AMERICA PAST AND PRESENT 27 (1961). 
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establishments were, as Jed Rubenfeld demonstrates, “features of the 
American landscape.”22 
The adoption of neither the United States Constitution, nor even the 
Bill of Rights, did much to change the establishmentarian disposition 
among the several states. And one should not have expected much to 
change either, because the Bill of Rights was not intended to disrupt the 
state religious establishments at the time. Looking back to the actual politi-
cal practice of the day, the Establishment Clause “did not disestablish 
anything,” writes Michael McConnell, stressing the most important point 
to appreciate about the Clause: “It prevented the newly formed federal 
government from establishing religion or from interfering in the religious 
establishments of the states.”23 The founding design of the Esta blishment 
Clause is therefore more correctly understood as a federalism-reinforcing 
device, intended to protect the states from the intrusive reach of the  na-
tional government in matters of r eligion and to sa feguard the sphe re of 
sovereignty belonging to states.24 
Consider the religious establishments that existed at the founding, 
some of which persisted even after the adoption of the Establishment 
Clause and the larger Bill of Rights. Connecticut’s 1776 Constitution 
established Christianity as the governing faith25 and the state mandated a 
religious test for office requiring a disavowal of Catholicism.26 It was not 
until 1818 that the state finally disestablished its state church.27 The Mas-
sachusetts Constitution gave a preference to Protestantism,28 a preference 
which endured until 1833 when the state formally disestablished.29 For its 
part, New Hampshire established Congregationalism,30 held fast t o a 
Protestant test for office,31 and did not disestablish until 1819.32 South 
Carolina established Protestantism33 and disestablished it in 1790.34 
 
 22. Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really was Unconstitutional, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 2347, 2351 (1997). 
 23. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the F ounding, Part I: Estab-
lishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2109 (2003). 
 24. Douglas G. Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of E ighteenth-Century Corporate 
Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 240 (2003). 
 25. CONN. CONST. of 1776 pmbl. 
 26. Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and t he Constitution of Religious Liberty: A 
Machine that Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 681–83 (1987). 
 27. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS 120 (1987). 
 28. MASS. CONST. art. III. 
 29. SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE  LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA 5–6 (2010). 
 30. Michael R. O’Neill, Government’s Denigration of Religion: Is God the Victim of Discrimina-
tion in Our Public Schools?, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 477, 525 n.380 (1994). 
 31. N.H. CONST. Bill of Rights, art I, § VI. 
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But religious establishments are not the only way to exhibit a pref-
erence for religion or an antipathy for non-religion. State religious tests 
are an equally effective way to signal an official position, and they did 
not run afoul of the Establishment Clause in the early years of the repub-
lic. Although some states had no officially established religion after the 
adoption of the United States Constitution, they nonetheless imposed reli-
gious tests for public office within the state. This is true of Delaware,35 
Georgia,36 Maryland,37 New Jersey,38 New York,39 North Carolina,40 and 
Pennsylvania.41 As for Virginia, it was not until 1830 that its Constitu-
tion was amended to enshrine within it a proscription against religious 
tests.42 The only state to neither establish a religion nor require a religious 
test was Rhode Island,43 which was founded by Roger Williams, the great 
defender of religious freedom.44 
That was the founding landscape of law and religion in early Ameri-
ca. The portrait actually becomes clearer if we examine the founding land-
scape from a hig her level of abstraction. Looking at the whole of the 
early American tradition of religion and government against the back-
drop of the lived experiences of the states as well as the constitutional text 
itself allows us to uncover the three general signposts that informed the 
founding design of the Establishment Clause: (1) national interdiction; (2) 
congressional disability; and (3) state sovereignty. Let us understand these 
three signposts as the three principles that stand at the very base of the 
founding design of the Establishment Clause. 
 
 32. Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 1995 BYU L. REV. 
439, 452 n.41 (1995). 
 33. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII. 
 34. Frederick V. Mills, Sr., Disestablishment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION IN THE SOUTH 260, 
261 (Samuel S. Hill et al. eds., 2005). 
 35. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII. 
 36. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VI. 
 37. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (invalidating Maryland’s religious test). 
 38. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX. 
 39. MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 
58 (1996). 
 40. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXII. 
 41. PA. CONST. of 1776, Plan or Frame of Government for the Commonwealth or State of Penn-
sylvania § 10. 
 42. ABEL C. THOMAS, STRICTURES ON RELIGIOUS TESTS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LATE 
REFORM CONVENTION 21 (1838). 
 43. Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams’ Gift: Religious Freedom in America , 4 ROGER WILLIAMS 
U. L. REV. 425, 483 (1999). 
 44. Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foun dations of Religious Libe rty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 
455, 462–63 (1991). 
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The Establishment Clause’s first founding principle is prohibitory. At 
the founding, the Clause constrained the actions of only the national gov-
ernment, not the states.45 Proof positive is the multiplicity of intimate 
relationships between religion and government within the several states 
even after the adoption of the Esta blishment Clause—relationships that 
would have otherwise violated the Clause had it applied to the states. The 
second principle in the design of the Clause is derivative of the first and 
also disabling in the sense that it disempowers an institution from taking 
action. The Esta blishment Clause did not prohibit the entirety of the na-
tional government from establishing a religion. It was only Congress that 
was the target of the drafters of the Establishment Clause. This is evident 
in the very language of the Clause: “Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion. . . .”46 Finally, the third principle that 
lay beneath the founding design of the Establishment Clause is state sov-
ereignty. States were to retain the power to regulate matters of faith ac-
cording to their own local rules and conventions, undisturbed by the risk of 
encroachment by the new national government.47 
National interdiction, congressional disability, and state sovereign-
ty—those, then, were the three principles that informed the design of the 
Establishment Clause. Together, they created wide latitude for states to 
manage the boundary between religion and government, such that some 
states ultimately opted to erect a wall between the two while others chose 
a more osmotic membrane that allowed close collaboration and inter-
change between them. While the Establishment Clause had forbidden the 
national government, specifically the Congress, from cultivating too cozy 
a connection to religion and religious institutions, the Clause had mandat-
ed no such proscription upon the states. Quite the contrary, the states re-
mained free to continue their own preferred practices as to the relationship 
between religion and government. There were therefore two regimes gov-
 
 45. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltim ore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 251 (1833) (“These amendments 
[listed in the Bill of Rights] contain no expression in dicating an intention to apply the m to the stat e 
governments. This court cannot so apply them.”). 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. I. It is also evident by inference from the religiously-inspired words and 
deeds of the President of  the Unite d States and some Justices on the Supr eme Court of the United  
States, the two other branches in the national government. Early Presidents invoked Christianity in their 
respective Inaugural Addresses, see, for example, John Adams, President, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 
1797), at par a. 12, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/adams.asp; William Henry 
Harrison, President, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1841), at par a. 24, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/harrison.asp; James Buchanan, President, Inaugural Address  
(Mar. 4, 1857), at par a. 19, available at http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres30.html, and a Supre me 
Court Justice used a majority opinion as a forum within which to call America a “Christian nation,” see 
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). 
 47. Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Do ctrine and Discourse of R eligious 
Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV.1810, 1823 (2004). 
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erning the constitutional law of religion and government: one for the na-
tional government and one for its state counterparts. 
B. The Modern Premise 
It was not until the incorporation of the Establishment Clause that the 
American superstructure of law and religion changed as a matter of 
constitutional law. Before then, the relationship between law and religion 
was governed largely according to state-specific choices. Unconstrained by 
the Establishment Clause, states could establish or disestablish, favor or 
disfavor, fund or defund religion according to the will of their constitu-
ents and state political actors.48 “In short,” writes Akhil Amar, “the origi-
nal establishment clause was a home rule-local option provision mandating 
imperial neutrality.”49 It was a hands-off rule that militated in favor of 
state autonomy. But that changed—and quite dramatically—when the 
Court cast aside the founding design in recognition of the new social and 
political realities of modern America. 
Beginning in the 1920s, the Supreme Court began to interpret the Bill 
of Rights as restricting not only the national government but also the sev-
eral state governments.50 The consequence of incorporating the Bill of 
Rights against the states was to chip away at the independence they had 
enjoyed in the founding regime, when they could not only regulate 
matters of religion and religious belief but more broadly individual rights 
and liberties like the freedom of association51 and criminal defense pro-
tections.52 The Court’s greater oversight of state law and political prac-
tice sprang from its g rowing concern about federalism as a rights 
safeguard. Although federalism had originally been conceived as a struc-
tural protection for personal rights and as a g uarantor of interstate plural-
ism, the twentieth-century Court began to see federalism as providing 
insufficient protection for the nation’s budding intrastate pluralism. 
The defense of intrastate pluralism helps explain the Court’s first 
judgment, in 1940, to apply the First Amendment’s religious protections to 
the states. In Cantwell v. Connectic ut, the Court incorporated the Free 
Exercise Clause against the States, holding that a state statute could not 
 
 48. H. Wayne House, A Tale of Tw o Kingdoms: Can There be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion 
with the Secular State?, 13 BYU J. PUB.. L. 203, 209–10 (1999). 
 49. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 246 (1998). 
 50. See, e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 51. See, e.g., New York State Club Ass’ n, Inc. v. City of New Yor k, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); United 
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
 52. See, e.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
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lawfully ban Jehovah’s Witnesses from distributing religious pamphlets in 
a residential neighborhood.53 Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts ex-
plained that the Fourteenth Amendment had brought the states within the 
reach of the Bill of Rights and that the states could no longer take shelter 
under the cover of state sovereignty to immunize their rights violations.54 
That was a critical point in the Court’s decision. But the most important 
statement appeared in the Court’s justification for incorporating the reli-
gious liberties in the  Bill of Rights against the states. Anticipating the 
criticism that states should be free to regulate religion, as had been the 
case under the founding design, the Court brandished its new argument of 
pluralism as a reason why the Bill of Rights should temper state power: 
“The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under their shield 
many types of lif e, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested 
and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary than in our own 
country for a people composed of many races and of many creeds.”55 The 
Court therefore affirmed itself as the defender of individual rights, against 
incursions by both the national government and the states. 
The same t heme reappeared when the Court incorporated the Estab-
lishment Clause. Everson v. Board of  Education concerned a New Jersey 
law that reimbursed parents for the cost of their children’s transportation 
to public schools as well as to p rivate Catholic schools.56 The plaintiff 
challenged the law as a violation of the Establishment Clause because 
it compelled him to financially support Catholicism through his tax dol-
lars.57 The Court disagreed, but still invoked the principle of pluralism 
upon which it had relied seven years prior in Cantwell.58 The Establish-
ment Clause cannot tolerate a program that gives a financial preference to 
one religion over another, wrote the Court, because that ignores the reli-
gious pluralism within the state of New Jersey.59 If it wants to respect the 
Clause, New Jersey “cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mo-
hammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or 
the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from 
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.”60 
 
 53. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 54. Id. at 303. 
 55. Id. at 310. 
 56. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 57. Id. at 3–4. 
 58. Id. at 15–17.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original). 
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Here, again, we see the Court’s solicitude for the new reality of reli-
gious pluralism within states. 
Intrastate pluralism, then, is what spurred the Court to reset the 
balance of powers between the national and state authorities. In all types 
of cases implicating religion and its establishment, the Court began to in-
sert itself as a protective shield between states and their citizens, where 
there had once been nothing but state-level institutions to mediate the 
boundary separating citizens from their state. With the Establishment 
Clause as its sword and the defense of religious pluralism within states as 
its purpose, the Court struck down state-mandated school prayer in public 
schools,61 Bible readings in public sc hools,62 Ten Commandments’ dis-
plays in public schools,63 and prohibitions on teaching evolution in pub-
lic schools.64 In the interest of religious pluralism, the Court also struck 
down public subsidies for textbooks and salaries at religious schools65 as 
well as the e rection of a nativity scene on public property.66 Amid the 
Court’s several invalidations, the Court also upheld many state laws that, 
in its view, accorded with the new modern premise of religious pluralism.67 
II. THE SPECIALNESS OF RELIGION 
Deep within the core of the Court’s case law on religion is a convic-
tion that religion is special.68 From the founding to today, religion has 
commanded a deep reverence from the Court. And with reason, because 
the founders intended religion to benefit from protections more robust than 
those conferred upon other manifestations of thought and action.69 Indeed, 
the special protection for religion is perhaps America’s foremost constitu-
tional value,70 enshrined as it is in the very first words of the very first 
amendment to the Constitution. Nowhere is the specialness of religion 
 
 61. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). 
 62. See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). 
 63. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1980). 
 64. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968). 
 65. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). 
 66. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601–02 (1989). 
 67. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 
(1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
 68. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14–34 
(1985). 
 69. Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 673, 676–77 (2002). 
 70. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 94 (1980). 
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more evident than in the Court’s development and dismantling of taxpayer 
standing under the Establishment Clause. 
Yet the rules of taxpayer standing are neither obvious nor reducible to 
a clear and concise statement. Quite the contrary, the Court has itself rec-
ognized that “the concept [of st anding] cannot be reduced to a one-
sentence or one-paragraph definition.”71 Scholars have been more criti-
cal, one describing the Court’s standing approach as “confused,”72 an-
other suggesting that the Court’s “strange doctrine in this area need[s] 
clarifying,”73 and still another decrying that “the Supreme Court’s own 
explanation of the [taxpayer standing] exception borders on gibberish.”74 
What lies beneath these criticisms, however, is more than invective. It 
is a legitimate grievance that taxpayer standing under the Establishment 
Clause is anchored to what has evolved into something of a right that con-
cerns more government expenditures than religious liberty.75 
Part of the Court’s difficulty in promoting clarity in taxpayer standing 
has been its own disquiet about the theory of standing that should govern 
access to c ourts. Faced with three standing options before it—a public 
rights model of standing where citizens may sue in the name of the larger 
public interest, a private rights model which limits standing to those who 
have suffered a personal injury, and a quasi-public model—the Court ulti-
mately chose the last one: a standing regime under which, as Andy Hessick 
defines, “litigants no longer had standing only to vindicate their own, pri-
vate rights but also could sue to vindicate public interests.”76 Today, the 
taxpayer standing doctrine blends both public and private rights because 
taxpayer suits under the Establishment Clause rest on twin misgivings 
about the government overstepping the boundary separating religion from 
the state and also about personal liberties.77 
But whether the Establishment Clause should invite the vindication of 
both private and public rights is unclear. On one common view, a public 
 
 71. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 475 (1982). 
 72. Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 
561, 607 (1997). 
 73. Kyle Duncan, Misunderstanding Freedom from R eligion: Two Cents o n Madison’s Three 
Pence, 9 NEV. L.J. 32, 33 (2008). 
 74. Steven D. S mith, Taxes, Conscience, and the Constitu tion, 23 C ONST. COMMENT. 365, 370 
(2006). 
 75. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach 
to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 348 n.163 (1986). 
 76. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 
294 (2008). 
 77. Donald L. Beschle, The Supreme Court’s IOLTA Decision: Of Dogs, Mangers, and the Ghost 
of Mrs. Frothingham, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 846, 876 (2000). 
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endorsement or censure of a religion or of religion in general triggers the 
rights of only the affected sub-class of individuals whose religion is disfa-
vored.78 For instance, where the state grants tax exemptions to parents 
whose children attend Christian denomination private schools, only those 
parents whose children attend non-Christian denomination schools could 
be argued to suffer an injury, if indeed that treatment amounted to an 
injury at all. According to the competing view, however, any govern-
mental effort to advance religion or indeed to hinder it implicates the 
rights of all citizens, irrespective of their personal relationship to the fa-
vored or impugned religion.79 For whether or not a person is an adherent 
to the religion, or any religion, her status as either an adherent or a non -
adherent will be a ffected by the government’s choice to involve itself in 
religious affairs. In this respect, the right against a governmental estab-
lishment of religion is the paradigmatic public right that touches all per-
sons. And that is precisely what spurred the Court to give taxpayers special 
access to federal courts for Establishment Clause violations. 
A. The Rise of Taxpayer Standing 
Taxpayer standing was prohibited before it was allowed. In the 
Court’s opening pronouncement on taxpayer standing, individuals were 
denied the right to challenge federal appropriations in their capacity as 
citizens required to pay federal taxes.80 On the theory that the plaintiff’s 
alleged injury was interchangeable with what any other taxpayer might 
raise as an injury suffered on the same facts, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that a citizen could challenge a federal expenditure as violative of her 
constitutional rights. This reflects the Court’s prohibition against hearing 
claims that challenge an alleged harm too diffuse to allow anything but 
abstract review. The general rule holds that the Court refuses standing 
“when the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared in a substantial-
ly equal measure by all or a lar ge class of citizens.”81 The Court’s initial 
posture was therefore to refuse standing to a taxpayer insofar as she was 
indistinguishable from her fellow citizens with respect to the interests she 
claimed had been violated by federal expenditures. 
 
 78. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment C lause, 77 N.Y.U. L.  
REV. 346, 414 n.356 (2002). 
 79. See, e.g., Anne Abramowitz, A Remedy for Every Right: What Federal Courts Can Learn from 
California’s Taxpayer Standing, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1595, 1609 (2010); Derek P. Apanovitch, Religion 
and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God by the State, 47 DUKE L.J. 785, 839 (1998). 
 80. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487–99 (1923). 
 81. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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But the Court later created an exception to the rule against taxpayer 
standing. Taxpayers are not all created equal, suggested the Court in Flast 
v. Cohen, at least when federal expenditures implicate a taxpayer’s reli-
gion and religious beliefs.82 More broadly, the Flast Court sought to 
give constitutional cover to an individual challenging a federal appropria-
tion that violates a constitutional provision—even though such a claim 
might otherwise be disqualified as a generalized grievance. Unlike the 
conventional rules of standing which require the claimant to prove that she 
has suffered an injury that sets her apart from the larger community of 
citizens,83 taxpayer standing calls for no such showing under the holding of 
Flast. Even though the claimant may not have been subjected to the coer-
cive force of the state and her religious observance may not have been 
burdened, the Court’s taxpayer standing policy grants her the right to stand 
as a surrogate for the larger population that would object to the complicity 
between religion and government.84 In Carl Esbeck’s view, the Flast 
exception has constitutional merit because it is indispensable to the rights 
preserved under the Establishment Clause.85 
Flast involved a challenge to federal expenditures that plaintiffs ar-
gued were unconstitutionally subsidizing religious schools. Retreating 
from its rule in Frothingham, the Court began to lay the foundation for 
permitting religion-based taxpayer standing when it observed that there 
exists “no absolute bar in Article III to suits by federal taxpayers challeng-
ing allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing and spending programs.”86 
Given that the Flast plaintiffs sought to invalidate a congressional program 
under the Establishment Clause, the Court granted them standing, though 
not before articulating its nexus test, which all taxpayers requesting stand-
ing must satisfy.87 The test has two parts: first, the taxpayer must demon-
strate a rational connection between her status as a taxpayer and the 
governmental action she seeks to invalidate; and second, the taxpayer must 
establish what the Court called a “nexus” between her status as a taxpayer 
and the alleged constitutional violation.88 To refine the point, the nexus 
test applies only where Congress has exercised its taxing and spending 
 
 82. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 83. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978). 
 84. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 
84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 35–36 (1998). 
 85. Carl H. Esbeck, What the Hein Decision Can Tell Us About the Roberts Court and the Estab-
lishment Clause, 78 MISS. L.J. 199, 212 (2008). 
 86. Flast, 392 U.S. at 101. 
 87. Id. at 102. 
 88. Id. 
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powers, not any other power delegated to it under Article I.89 On the 
facts of Flast, the challengers met the two-part test because the Estab-
lishment Clause’s purpose, reasoned the Court, was to forbid the federal 
government from taxing and spending to the benefit of religion.90 
The doctrine of taxpayer standing is really about the vindication of 
specific rights, in this case the right to religious freedom and the corollary 
right to freedom from government establishments of religion. It transforms 
the structural protection of the Establishment Clause that erects a barrier 
between religion and government into an individual right against public 
funding flowing to religious institutions.91 This makes eminent sense 
from our vantage point now, looking back at the development of taxpay-
er standing. But the r ise of ta xpayer standing was not preordained in 
America’s constitutional unfolding nor does the constitutional text itself 
even gesture toward it. All of which raises an important question: Why 
did the Court deem it necessary to create an Establishment Clause excep-
tion to the standing rules? 
There are two reasons why the Court created the Establishment 
Clause exception to taxpayer standing. The first reason was the difficulty 
the Court perceived citizens would have in meeting the general test for 
achieving standing. And the se cond reason was the Court’s inclination to 
constitutionalize the specialness of religion. Back to the first, which is the 
more obvious of the two , the underlying concern is that establishment 
violations, like other far-reaching injuries, are generally too diffuse for a 
challenger to meet the r equirements of sta nding.92 Without the taxpayer 
exception, there would have been no way for establishment challengers to 
clear the high hurdle set by the Court’s standing rules given the proscrip-
tion on generalized grievances. Still, this does not explain why the Court 
wanted to make possible establishment challenges as opposed to other 
challenges that are barred by standing rules. The answer lies in the second 
reason for the Court’s taxpayer standing exception. 
The real nub of the reason why the Court created the Establishment 
Clause exception was to recognize the specialness of religion. In order to 
grasp this point, it is necessary to understand the difference between what 
Ira Lupu calls a p olity principle and a rights principle.93 A rights princi-
 
 89. See Kristin E. Hickman, How Did We Get Here Anyway?: Considering the Standing Question 
in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 55 (2006). 
 90. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103. 
 91. See Saul Zipkin, Democratic Standing, 26 J.L. & POL. 179, 232 (2011). 
 92. See Gwendolyn McKee, Standing on a Spectrum: Third Party Standing in the United States , 
Canada, and Australia, 16 BARRY L. REV. 115, 122 (2011). 
 93. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 235 (1994). 
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ple, explains Lupu, is one that operates to limit court access to parties 
whose own personal interests are triggered by state action.94 Therefore, to 
vindicate a rights principle, there must exist a strong connection among the 
action, the right implicated, and the party to whom the right personally 
belongs. In contrast, a polity principle can be enforced in court by per-
sons who are not directly impacted by the state action at issue.95 As Lupu 
writes, “enforcement of polity principles through adjudication requires 
assignment of enforcement rights to private attorneys general, i.e., to 
those who l ack a st rong personal stake but ne vertheless are sufficiently 
committed to the cause that they will litigate aggressively on behalf of 
structural concerns.”96 
The Court’s taxpayer standing exception is a polity principle pursuant 
to which virtually anyone could challenge a governmental action thought 
to violate the Establishment Clause, even if the state action had not com-
promised the claimant’s own personal right. 
To allow any citizen to raise an establishment claim—contrary to the 
conventional rules of standing—is to signal quite emphatically that reli-
gion and religious claims are special. By creating the taxpayer standing 
exception, the Court set religion apart from the other rights, freedoms, and 
structures that are subject to the limitations against generalized grievances, 
abstract review, and concrete and particularized injury-in-fact. True, the 
Court has never foreclosed the possibility that taxpayer standing could 
well extend beyond the Establishment Clause context.97 That could con-
ceivably undercut religion’s claim to specialness. But that the Court has 
not yet applied taxpayer standing to anything but the Esta blishment 
Clause proves to us that the Court regards the freedom from establish-
ment differently from other constitutional protections, at least for now. 
Whether the Court will shift on this question is anyone’s guess. 
B. The Erosion of Taxpayer Standing 
Despite the Court’s insistence that taxpayer standing remains a viable 
vehicle for contesting the coziness of religion and government,98 scholars 
have reached a contrary conclusion. Today, writes one commentator, 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name W e Pray: Fixing the E stablishment Clause Tr ain 
Wreck Involving Legislative Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 275 (2008). 
 98. See Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011). 
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“taxpayer standing is as unsuccessful a way to challenge public accommo-
dation of religion as it was some eighty years ago in Frothingham.”99 
There is some truth to that criticism. Over the past thirty years, the 
Court has gradually eroded the ground upon which the Flast exception 
was built. But it has done so without dispossessing religion of the spe-
cialness in which Flast clothed it. 
The first major blow to the doctrine of taxpayer standing came in 
Valley Forge.100 The Valley Forge Court, according to Abram Chayes, 
“went out of its way to strip Flast of any remaining generative poten-
tial.”101 The two cases reach such apparently contradictory results that 
William Fletcher has remarked that “it should be clear that either 
Flast or Valley Forge is wrongly decided.”102 At the time clearly divided 
among themselves, the justices in Valley Forge began what may now in 
retrospect be inte rpreted as a careful effort to delimit Flast.103 Whereas 
Flast had authorized taxpayers to challenge federal expenditures that 
conferred upon religious institutions the imprimatur of the government in 
violation of the Establishment Clause, the facts in Valley Forge did not 
persuade the Court that the same risk of entangling state with church 
exists when the federal government grants land to a religious institu-
tion.104 The Valley Forge Court consequently denied standing to a citizen 
who had objected to a congressional land grant to a religious college.105 
The result in Valley Forge is important because it demonstrates the 
Court’s reluctance to expand, and indeed its effort to shrink, the Flast ex-
ception.106 
A subsequent case did nothing to strengthen Flast. In Newdow, which 
was an unsuccessful challenge to the constitutionality of the Pledge of 
Allegiance, the Court denied standing to a f ather who had sought to 
bring a suit on be half of his daughter.107 Although the plaintiff’s claims 
were grounded in the Establishment Clause—which would have presum-
ably placed him squarely within the realm of taxpayer standing, for which 
 
 99. Catherine M.A. McCauliff, Religion and the Secular State, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 31, 48 (2010). 
 100. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464 (1982). 
 101. Chayes, supra note 10, at 12. 
 102. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 268 (1988). 
 103. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 
61 N.C. L. REV. 798, 819 (1983). 
 104. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479–80. 
 105. Id. at 490.  
 106. Luke Meier, Constitutional Structure, Individual Rights, and the Pledge of Allegiance, 5 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 162, 179 (2006). 
 107. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
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the only exception recognized thus far is the Establishment Clause itself—
the Court did not even cite Flast. This is admittedly consistent with the 
Court’s earlier and later rulings involving taxpayer standing in which 
the Court gave Flast little deference. Yet to not even gesture toward the 
leading case in the subject matter area is unusual for the Court. Unless, that 
is, the Court has carefully considered its omission. Perhaps at the time of 
Newdow the omission could have been seen as an honest oversight. But 
today, given the Supreme Court’s rulings in the aftermath, it seems 
something more was at play, namely the marginalization of the Flast rule. 
The Court struck a more serious blow to Flast in Hein.108 Two jus-
tices, in a concurring opinion, took the view that the Court should 
overrule the Flast exception.109 Imagine for a moment America without 
the Flast exception. Were Flast overruled, the rule in Frothingham 
would control whether taxpayers could bring their establishment claims to 
federal court. Recall that Frothingham denies individuals the power to 
challenge federal appropriations as violative of the Establishment Clause 
in their personal capacity as citizens obligated to pay taxes to the 
federal government.110 The consequence of denying taxpayers the power 
to sue in federal court under the Establishment Clause is to effectively 
shield states from federal judicial oversight. In such a regime approximat-
ing the founding design of the Es tablishment Clause, states would con-
ceivably displace citizens as the proper plaintiffs. In a return to the 
founding regime where the Establishment Clause is effectively de-
incorporated, Congress could not make any law establishing a religion. 
And were Congress to pass a law affecting the right of states to establish 
or not establish a religion, states could in turn file suit to vindicate their 
freedom from congressional intrusion into their sovereign sphere. 
But Flast has not yet been repudiated. Nonetheless, although the 
Hein plurality did not expressly overrule Flast, it did limit the Flast rule 
quite severely to a set of circumstances that in many ways belies the Flast 
Court’s intended application. Hein held that a taxpayer could not sue under 
Flast to invalidate the White House’s practice of using, at its discretion, 
general Executive Branch appropriations to organize conferences in fur-
therance of the President’s faith-based initiatives program.111 The basic 
rule emerging from Hein is the refore that taxpayer standing does not 
extend to a claimant wishing to challenge discretionary Executive ex-
 
 108. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007). 
 109. Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 110. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487–99 (1923). 
 111. Hein, 551 U.S. at 605. 
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penditures that violate the Establishment Clause, and instead applies only 
to what was at issue in Flast: congressional expenditures, or expenditures 
specifically authorized by Congress, that violate the Establishment 
Clause.112 
One could certainly defend the Court’s distinction in Hein. But the 
distinction cannot be anchored in Flast, where the Court rests it, because 
Flast did not cite, nor e ven hint at, the difference between Executive 
Branch and congressional expenditures.113 Quite the contrary, the Flast 
Court spoke only of the “expenditure of federal tax funds,”114 which would 
capture expenditures by all branches of government. The animating theory 
of Flast did not turn on where the government expenditures originated, 
whether the legislative or executive branch. Instead, Flast articulated 
plainly its disapproval of public dollars being used in violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause, which implicates tax dollars impermissibly spent 
both by Congress and under the direction of the President.115 Yet Hein 
interpreted Flast otherwise, such that now it appears to be the case that 
taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause is available only pur-
suant to an identifiable congressional appropriation, and that alone.116 
The Court’s most recent taxpayer standing case has only further en-
trenched the unfavorable disposition toward the Flast exception. In 
Winn, the Court weighed the constitutionality of an Arizona law that af-
forded tax credits for private donations in support of School Tuition Or-
ganizations, which distributed those funds to private school students, 
including some who attended religious schools.117 The Court denied stand-
ing to a group of Arizona taxpayers who argued that the law infringed up-
on the Establishment Clause.118 Yet the Arizona law had appeared to be a 
state government analogue to the very facts that had been contested in 
Flast: a taxing and spending provision authorized by the legislature dis-
burses public funds to religious institutions. Given that the plaintiffs were 
taxpayers who could reasonably be argued to meet the two prongs of the 
Flast test—a logical connection to the legislative taxing and spending 
power and a nexus between the alleged violation and the taxpayers’ inter-
 
 112. Id. at 610. 
 113. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda 
v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 10 (2010). 
 114. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968). 
 115. Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 29–30 
(2009). 
 116. See Gillian E. Metzger, Remarks of Gillian E. Metzger, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 459, 
462 (2009). 
 117. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011). 
 118. Id. 
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ests—one could have expected the Court to grant standing. But it did not, 
distinguishing Flast from this particular case on the  theory that the mon-
ey being disbursed to religious schools came not from the public but rather 
from private individuals, in contrast to the facts in Flast where the 
money had been fully public.119 In the aftermath of Winn, the rule of 
taxpayer standing is narrower than ever before. 
Though some of the Court’s recent taxpayer standing cases may sug-
gest it no longer regards religion as special,120 I think the contrary is 
true. As we read in Newdow, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion 
recognizes that “[t]he Court has permitted government, in some instances, 
to refer to o r commemorate religion in public life.”121 Why? Because 
“some references to religion in public life and government are the inevita-
ble consequence of our Nation’s origins.”122 Yet “[t]hese references are 
not minor trespasses upon the Establishment Clause . . . . [T]heir history, 
character, and context prevent them from being constitutional violations at 
all.”123 Justice O’Connor concluded with a tr ibute to the r ole of religion 
in American life: “It would be ironic indeed if this Court were to wield our 
constitutional commitment to religious freedom so as to sever our ties to 
the traditions developed to honor it.”124 Justice O’Connor expressed simi-
lar views in McCreary County v. ACLU, where she affirmed that the 
Founders’ reverence for “religion’s special role in society” continues to 
inform the Court’s approach to religion.125 
But it is the Court’s taxpayer standing judgments themselves that 
convince me religion remains special in its vie w. The Court’s disman-
tling of the taxpayer standing doctrine is not without consequence, and 
the Court recognizes that. When the Court created the taxpayer standing 
doctrine, it was grounded in the Court’s desire to grant autonomy to the 
individual to choose or r eject religion. The c onsequence of g ranting tax-
payer standing under the Establishment Clause was to localize religious 
beliefs within the individual and away from the several states, where it 
had been anchored at the founding. But the Court’s recent retrenchment 
on taxpayer standing—though it has likewise been anchored in the  
Court’s desire to give more autonomy to choose or reject religion—has 
 
 119. Id. at 1447. 
 120. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian C oll. v. A ms. United for Separation of Chur ch and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 488 (1982). 
 121. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 37. 
 124. Id. at 44–45. 
 125. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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returned autonomy to the states, which now share it with the individuals 
located within each of the several states. We may therefore see the emer-
gence of a state-specific menu of establishment rules. This is a different 
way of recognizing the specialness of religion: it projects the view that 
religion and religious belief are better protected by the states, which can 
speak directly and differently to their respective communities, rather than 
by the national government, which cannot accommodate state-specific 
religious sensibilities as efficiently or effectively as a state-centric Estab-
lishment Clause. 
III. THE REDISCOVERY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The erosion of taxpayer standing has provoked observers to proclaim 
their disapproval with the Court’s recent turn against granting standing in 
Establishment Clause cases. One critic has described the Court’s distinc-
tion of Hein from Flast as “far from persuasive,”126 another as “unprinci-
pled and unsustainable,”127 and still another as “fatuous.”128 This is a 
difficult charge to neutralize for a Court whose transparent effort to 
pinch down upon the taxpayer standing doctrine has been understood as 
“further muddl[ing] an already unclear taxpayer standing doctrine.”129 
These charges may be right but they do not fully explain what lies beneath 
the Court’s constitutional law. To understand the Court’s taxpayer standing 
case law requires us to draw equally from constitutional law as from con-
stitutional politics. Only then may we uncover what could be the Court’s 
jurisprudential ambitions: returning to the founding design of the Estab-
lishment Clause. 
A. The Path to De-Incorporation 
The slow march toward the de -incorporation of the Establishment 
Clause may have paradoxically begun with its incorporation. In Everson, 
the Court applied the Establishment Clause against the states, finally 
bringing the state governments into conformity with the standards set by 
the Constitution.130 Interestingly, Everson had been from the beginning a 
 
 126. Stephen Reinhardt, Life to Death: Our Constitution and How It Grow s, 44 U. C. DAVIS L. 
REV.. 391, 400 n.36 (2010). 
 127. Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1061, 1083 
(2009). 
 128. Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 431 (2007). 
 129. Lauren S. Micha els, Recent Development, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation: 
Sitting This One Out—Denying Taxpayer Standing to Challenge Faith-Based Funding , 43 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 213, 233 (2008). 
 130. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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case about taxpayer standing, but the Court chose not de fine it in those 
terms.131 This is surprising given that the Court itself wrote in its judgment 
that “[t]he appellant, in his capacity as a district taxpayer, filed suit in a 
State court challenging the right of the Board to reimburse parents of 
parochial school students.”132 
Nonetheless, the Everson Court’s ruling created a path dependency 
that may help explain where we are today on taxpayer standing. The 
relevant facts of Everson bear remembering: a New Jersey statute author-
ized travel reimbursements to parents of children attending public and 
private Catholic schools.133 In reaching its judgment, the Court reasoned 
that “[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. 
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the 
slightest breach.”134 This powerful line of reasoning would lead most read-
ers to conclude that the Court invalidated New Jersey’s reimbursement 
program, particularly given that the state had chosen to reimburse only 
Catholic schools among eligible private schools to the exclusion of other 
private denominational schools. But the Court concluded otherwise, some-
how reasoning that “New Jersey has not breached [the wall of separation] 
here.”135 The great irony in Everson is the Court’s proclamation that states 
were henceforth bound by the strictures of the Establishment Clause yet, 
on these particular facts, the Clause did not apply. 
Everson was a peculiar case. On the one hand, Everson marked a win 
for those who believe in the separation of church from state insofar as 
the reach of the Establishment Clause was expanded to the states. That is 
of course the consequence of incorporating the Establishment Clause in the 
Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause onto the states. It requires, 
at least nominally, the same degree of separation between religion and 
government at the state level as the Bill of Rights commands at the na-
tional level. On the other hand, though, that the Everson Court upheld the 
New Jersey law was also a triumph for those who c hampion state sover-
eignty. New Jersey’s prerogatives were shielded against invalidation at the 
hands of national institutions a nd compulsions. This raises an important 
question: Why did the Court resolve Everson in this way, giving a partial 
victory to both separationists and state sovereigntists? The answer returns 
us to the founding design of the Establishment Clause. 
 
 131. Carl H. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent and the Virginia Disestablishment, 1776–1786, 7 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 51, 60 (2009). 
 132. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. 
 133. Id. at 3–4. 
 134. Id. at 18. 
 135. Id. 
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Recall that the founding design of the Establishment Clause was 
national-centric. The Clause, as originally designed and interpreted, con-
strained the actions of only the national government, not the states. Incor-
poration changed that, causing the Establishment Clause to constrain the 
actions of both the national and state levels of government. But there 
was a collision between old and new in the transition from the founding 
design of liberty to the modern premise of pluralism. It was difficult for 
the Court to shed its pre-incorporationist skin, pursuant to which it grant-
ed great deference and wide latitude to states. This theme is echoed in 
the Court’s own words in Everson when it states, in the same breath, that 
the New Jersey law must be measured against the “limitations imposed 
by the First Amendment,”136 but that the Court must be careful to “not 
strike that state statute down if it is within the state’s constitutional 
power even though it approaches the verge of that power.”137 The Court’s 
equivocal statement of the law should not arouse criticism; it should instead 
invite understanding about the Court’s difficulty in transitioning the re-
public from an Establishment Clause oriented toward only the national 
government to one that would also oblige the states. 
Since Everson, the fate of the incorporated Establishment Clause has 
gone from uncertain to just about dead. Here is why: the three general 
signposts that informed the founding design of Establishment Clause prior 
to the Clause’s incorporation are now true once again. National interdic-
tion, congressional disability, and state sovereignty—these three principles 
have resurfaced as the organizing logic that gives the rules of ta xpayer 
standing under the Establishment Clause their basic structure. 
Consider the present status of each of these principles in turn, begin-
ning with national interdiction. Remember that the first principle of the 
Establishment Clause’s founding design is prohibitory, meaning that it 
restricts only the national government, not the states. The dissent in Winn 
explains to us why this is so, noting although the national government 
is barred by the Establishment Clause from subsidizing religion and reli-
gious institutions through the tax system,138 no similar constraint applies to 
the state governments: “From now on, [a state] government need follow 
just one simple rule—subsidize through the tax system—to preclude 
taxpayer challenges to state funding of religion.”139 Indeed, continues the 
 
 136. Id. at 16. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S.  Ct. 1436, 1462 (2011) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 1450. 
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dissent, under the current rules of taxpayer standing, a state could grant a 
tax credit to individua ls who purchase a crucifix, and no federal court 
could grant standing to an individual to challenge the state’s action.140 This 
approximates what governed under the founding design of the Esta blish-
ment Clause. Then, states had nearly free reign to help or hinder and 
promote or frustrate religion without worrying about citizens taking to 
the federal courts for relief. That appears to be the case—or if the trend 
continues, it may soon be the case—under the rules of taxpayer standing. 
The second principle of the founding design of the Establishment 
Clause is congressional disability. The important point here is that the Es-
tablishment Clause did not prohibit the whole of the national government 
from establishing a religion. It applied only to Congress. That was then. 
Today, Hein intimates a possible return to this second principle. Hein, of 
course, involved general Executive Branch appropriations in support of 
religion and religious institutions in connection with the program on 
faith-based and community initiatives. The Court sanctioned those ex-
penditures precisely because they were executive expenditures, and not 
congressional ones. Indeed, the Court cautioned expressly that Congress 
could not constitutionally get away with the same kind of activity because 
Congress is subject to r ules that differ from the ones that constrain other 
federal actors, namely the President and other executive branch officers.141 
This point is even narrower still. The modern Court has interpreted 
taxpayer standing so as to restrict access to the judiciary only to challeng-
es against congressional establishments of religion when Congress acts 
pursuant to its taxing and spending powers.142 The exchange between 
Justice Stephen Breyer and Solicitor General Paul Clement at the Supreme 
Court oral argument in Hein is worth examining on this sc ore. Would a 
taxpayer have standing, Justice Breyer asked the Solicitor General, if 
“Congress passes a statute and says in every city, town, and hamlet, we 
are going to have a mi nister, a Government minister, a Government 
church .  .  .  dedicated to the proposition that this particular sect is the true 
sect . . . .”143 The Solicitor General answered no, perhaps feeling under-
standably constrained by his uncompromising position that taxpayer stand-
ing exists only where Congress acts under its taxing and spending power 
to direct funds to religious institutions.144 But the Solicitor General’s dis-
 
 140. Id. at 1457. 
 141. See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593, 595 (2007). 
 142. Id. at 604. 
 143. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17–18, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 
587 (2007) (No. 06-157). 
 144. Id. at 18. 
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comfort is perhaps misplaced because the modern trend appears to support 
his view. 
Finally, state sovereignty is the third principle in the founding design 
of the Establishment Clause. Yet it may also be the formative principle 
today as the Court continues to chip away at the taxpayer standing doc-
trine. State sovereignty holds quite simply that states have determinative 
authority in the resolution of local problems, free of incursions by the 
national government. Just as the first two principles of the Clause’s found-
ing design appear to have resurfaced today, we no tice a similar develop-
ment for this third principle of state sovereignty. According to the Winn 
dissent, the case “offers a roadmap—more truly, just a one-step instruc-
tion—to any [state] government that wishes to insulate its financing of 
religious activity from legal challenge.”145 Specifically, “[s]tructure the 
funding as a tax expenditure, and Flast will not stand in the way. No tax-
payer will have standing to object.”146 And what will be the consequence? 
The dissent laments that, from now on, “[h]owever blatantly the [state] 
government may violate the Establishment Clause, taxpayers cannot 
gain access to the  federal courts.”147 
Given these recent cases—not to mention Newdow’s positive words 
about the plac e of religion in American civil society148—it may well be 
that the next generation of Establishment Clause case law will resemble 
the landscape prior to incorporation, characterized by three principles: na-
tional interdiction, congressional disability and state sovereignty. 
B. The Nonjusticiable Establishment Clause? 
The de-incorporation of the Establishment Clause could portend a 
new, perhaps laudable, judicial approach anchored in deference to state 
legislative choice. That may be what Chief Justice Rehnquist had in mind 
from the very beginning.149 Writing in Valley Forge, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist declared that “federal courts were simply not constituted as om-
budsmen of the general welfare.”150 Rehnquist appreciated that the Valley 
Forge plaintiffs had strong misgivings about what appeared to be a close 
 
 145. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1462 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 35–40 (2004) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring). 
 149. See Charles D. K elso & R. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue:  Transformations in Supreme 
Court Methodology, Doctrine and Results, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 93, 125 (1996). 
 150. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 487 (1982). 
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relationship between religion and government, but ultimately ruled on 
behalf of the Court that the plaintiffs’ emotional discomfort was insuffi-
cient for standing: “It is evident that respondents are firmly committed to 
the constitutional principle of separation of church and State, but standing 
is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest or the fervor of his 
advocacy.”151 In Rehnquist’s closing words in the majority opinion, he 
stressed that the Court should not take on th e role of social engineer and 
depart from the narrow judicial role envisioned in the Constitution: he 
wrote that he was “unwilling to countenance such a departure from the 
limits on judicial power contained in Art. III.”152 Rehnquist’s position has 
drawn significant criticism.153 But it may nonetheless contain much to ad-
mire. 
Let us remember from where springs the impetus to interpret standing 
rules narrowly. As the Court wrote in Newdow, “[t]he standing require-
ment is born partly of an idea, which is more than an intuition but less 
than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential 
limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind 
of government.”154 It is part of a larger effort to move the judiciary toward 
deferring more readily to legislative choice. What underpins this effort is 
the theory of judicial minimalism, which holds that courts should decide 
matters of moral contention and social division on the narrowest possible 
procedural grounds so as to trigger legislative and popular deliberation on 
those matters.155 There is great wisdom in cultivating a norm of judicial 
minimalism. It derives from what should be seen as an uncontroversial 
observation: that courts are less well institutionally equipped than legisla-
tures and citizens themselves to express social, cultural and political values. 
But it would be a mistake to associate exclusively with conservatism 
the posture of judicial deference to legislative choice. Though conservative 
constitutionalists typically favor a practice of judicial restraint, they are not 
alone; many prominent progressive constitutionalists likewise endorse 
judicial restraint bolstered by corollary theories of popular constitutional-
ism.156 
 
 151. Id. at 486. 
 152. Id. at 490. 
 153. Id. at 491 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 154. Elk Grove Unified Sch.  Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 11 ( 1994) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 155. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (1999). 
 156. See Jack Wade Nowlin, The Judicial Restraint Amendment: Populist Constitutional Reform in 
the Spirit of the Bill of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 171, 180 (2002). 
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The agreement does not stop at the academy, either. For proof, we 
may look to the far-from-conservative Obama Administration, which has 
in fact endorsed judicial restraint in taxpayer standing, most recently in a 
brief arguing against granting standing to the Winn plaintiffs and, failing 
that, urging the Court to uphold the impugned law in Winn.157 There are 
therefore important continuities between conservatives and progressives 
when it comes to taxpayer standing. Nevertheless, it is difficult to counter 
the argument that the last decade has been anything but a victory for con-
servative constitutional interpretation on taxpayer standing.158 
Consistent with the practice of judicial restraint, the modern Court 
may well have essentially adopted nonjusticiability as a rebuttable pre-
sumption for taxpayer standing under the Establishment Clause. The 
Court’s taxpayer standing cases—Newdow, Hein, Valley Forge, Winn—
all appear to tell a story about the Court’s “unwillingness to police official 
statements or government ceremonies that would otherwise be susceptible 
to the Court’s stated Establishment Clause principles.”159 That has been 
the consequence of the Court’s push for a return to the founding design of 
the Establishment Clause. National interdiction, congressional disability, 
and state sovereignty—together, these three signposts of t he Clause’s 
founding design will e ffectively render inoperative the Establishment 
Clause at the federal level. Here is why: federal courts, as bound by Su-
preme Court precedent, will grant standing only to the currently constricted 
range of cases in which plaintiffs claim that Congress has acted pursuant to 
its taxing and spending powers to favor or disfavor religion. If the Court’s 
current trajectory on taxpayer standing holds, all other cases will be dis-
missed for lack of standing, and therefore as nonjusticiable. This leaves 
very little room for a federal judicial role. 
Justice Kagan, in Winn, objected quite pa ssionately to the Court’s 
new position on taxpayer standing. On her reading, too, the Court’s cur-
rent taxpayer standing case law suggests that it will hear very few Estab-
lishment Clause challenges. Writing in dissent, Justice Kagan expressed 
her fear that “the Court’s arbitrary distinction [between appropriations and 
tax expenditures] threatens to eliminate all occasions for a taxpayer to 
 
 157. Erwin Chemerinsky et al., The Supreme Court 2009 Term Overview and 2010 Term Preview, 
27 TOURO L. REV. 33, 52 (2011). 
 158. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Ber man, Supreme Court R eview—Foreword, 44 T ULSA L. REV. 467, 
467–68 (2009); Lee Epstein et al., The Bush Imprint on the Supreme Court: Why Conservatives Should 
Continue to Yearn and Liberals Should Not Fear, 43 TULSA L. REV. 651, 653, 663–64 (2008). But see 
Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court Right: A Response to Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 
983, 998 (2008). 
 159. Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause , 89 TEX. L. REV. 
583, 601 (2011). 
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contest the g overnment’s monetary support of religion.”160 She further 
observed, with palpable lament and deep regret, that federal courts will 
henceforth be foreclosed as an avenue for a taxpayer to seek redress for 
unconstitutional establishments of religion: “Today’s holding therefore 
will prevent federal courts from determining whether some subsidies to 
sectarian organizations comport with our Constitution’s guarantee of reli-
gious neutrality.”161 Justice Kagan is absolutely correct in her analysis of 
the consequences of the Court’s taxpayer standing case law. But those 
consequences are not necessarily harmful. 
True, federal courts may soon be come—if they are not a lready—a 
dead-end for a taxpayer hoping to pursue an Establishment Clause claim. 
But that is not, nor has it ever been, the only avenue for a taxpayer 
seeking relief on Establishment Clause grounds. There have always 
been two other points of entry for a displeased taxpayer, and those would 
remain open to taxpayers even if Justice Kagan’s prediction comes true. 
The first is the s ystem of state courts; and the second is the electoral 
process. On the first point, it has always been true that a state taxpayer 
can petition her state courts for relief when the state violates her right to 
non-establishment or her right to religious freedom. State constitutions 
protect both of these rights.162 
That is an effective way for a state taxpayer to vindicate the rights she 
argues she ought to enjoy. Second, though, a state taxpayer always re-
 
 160. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1450 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis in original). 
 161. Id. at 1451. 
 162. The vast supermajority of states prohibit religious establishments. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. § 3; 
ALASKA CONST. § 1.4; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; A RK. CONST. art. II, § 24; C AL. CONST. art. I, § 4; 
COLO. CONST. art. I, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. 
CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 6; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 7; 
KY. CONST. § 5; LA. CONST. art. I, § 8; M E. CONST. art. I, § 3; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; MISS. 
CONST. art. III, § 18; M O. CONST. art. I, § 7; M ONT. CONST. art. II, § 5; NEB. CONST. art. I-4; N.H. 
CONST. art. 6; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.M. CONST. art II, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.D.  CONST. 
art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 5; OR. CONST. art. I, § 5; PA. CONST. art. I, 
§ 3; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7; 
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; VA. CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 
15; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18; W YO. CONST. art. I, § 19. Similarly, an equally vast number of states  
protect the right to religious freedom. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. § 3; ALASKA CONST. § 1.4; ARIZ. CONST. 
art. II, § 12; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 25; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; COLO. CONST. art I, § 4; CONN. CONST. 
art. I, § 3; DEL. CONST. art I, § 1; GA. CONST.. art. I, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. I, 
§ 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art I, §§ 2–4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; K AN. CONST. Bill of 
Rights § 7; K Y. CONST. § 5; L A. CONST. art. I, § 8; M E. CONST. art. I, § 3; M ICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; 
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 18; MO. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 
5; NEB. CONST. art. I-4; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.H. 
CONST. art. V; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.M. CONST. art II, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3; OHIO CONST. 
art. I, § 7; OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–4; PA. CONST. art. 1 § 3; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 
2; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; 
VA. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
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tains the right to express her grievances with her ballot. The electoral 
process is the most direct way for a st ate taxpayer to right a wrong she 
believes has been committed by those elected to a ct in her name. The 
United States Supreme Court has long recognized this point: 
Lack of standing within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction 
does not impair the right to assert [] v iews in the political forum or at 
the polls. Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional 
electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for 
changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens 
convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected repre-
sentatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to them.163 
So perhaps we should not fear the de-incorporation of the Establish-
ment Clause as much as some might suggest. Taxpayers would still 
have at their disposal a number of avenues to pursue their claims 
against the g overnment, both at the state level where public actors vio-
late state constitutional provisions and at the federal level where Congress 
acts pursuant to its taxing and spending powers in violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause. Furthermore, de-incorporating the Establishment Clause 
could have salutary consequences for the standing of the federal judiciary 
insofar as it would encourage federal courts to limit themselves to narrow 
pronouncements and to avoid sweeping statements that redesign the law in 
ways that “result in rules of wide applicability that are beyond Congress’ 
power to change.”164 That would be the undesirable result of a federal 
court exercising its judicial power and casting itself “in the role of a Coun-
cil of Revision, conferring on itself the power to invalidate laws at the 
behest of anyone who disagrees with them.”165 Were the Court to take 
that route, its insistence of serving as a c ourt of general jurisdiction 
would “undermine public confidence in the neutrality and integrity of the 
Judiciary,”166 to the detriment of the tripartite balance of powers that 
should govern the institutional structures of constitutional law. 
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, de-incorporating the Estab-
lishment Clause would be consistent with the project of cultivating a norm 
of judicial minimalism. To limit the role of federal courts is not to pinch 
down on civil and political rights nor is it to express a preference of 
majoritarianism for the sake of itself. Rather, it is to decentralize the gates 
of decision-making, removing the stranglehold the center currently enjoys 
and to disperse across the state and to their citizens meaningful tools of 
 
 163. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). 
 164. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449 (majority opinion). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
DRAFT 07 - Albert (Publish) 4/27/2012  8:58 AM 
896 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 87:3 
self-reflection and the fundamental power of self-definition. To situate the 
locus of authority in federal institutions without recognizing the diversity 
of views and sensibilities that governs across the land in the several states 
is to do a terrible disservice to our aspiration of creating a culture of active 
citizenship. Were federal courts to dismiss the counsel of self-restraint 
and zealously expand the standing doctrine rather than shrink it as they 
are currently doing,167 they would risk short-circuiting or preempting im-
portant deliberative processes between citizens and their elected represent-
atives and among citizens themselves. Those processes are critical to 
building public citizens who find fulfillment in popular engagement 
with fundamental questions of community and self-definition, of which 
religion is perhaps the most important of all. 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional law makes most sense when we appreciate the consti-
tutional politics behind it. Standing alone, the law of taxpayer standing 
appears confusing and confused because it suggests that the Court is not 
committed to any baseline constitutional principles. But when we view the 
law of taxpayer standing against the larger backdrop of the evolution of the 
Establishment Clause from the founding to today, we ca n more clearly 
perceive what the Court appears to be pursuing as a matter of constitution-
al policy: a return to the founding design of the Establishment Clause. At 
the founding, the Establishment Clause constrained the actions of only the 
national government, disabled only Congress from establishing a reli-
gion, and vigorously protected the sovereignty of states. The Court’s un-
folding Establishment Clause taxpayer standing case law suggests that each 
of these three signposts—national interdiction, congressional disability, and 
state sovereignty—may yet again soon hold true. 
Perhaps we are correct to conclude that the Court is slowly de-
incorporating the Establishment Clause. After all, the membership of the 
current Court does not seem inclined toward the modern Establishment 
Clause. Two justices would undo much of the current establishment case 
law, two would ease the restrictions on the interrelationship between reli-
 
 167. One scholar, for example, suggests expanding the First Amendment freedoms of religious 
institutions and concurrently broadening taxpayer standing to allow persons “to enforce the Estab-
lishment Clause precisely to preserve and maintain the integrity of religious entities as sovereign 
spheres.” See Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 130 (2009). 
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gion and government, and one looks particularly favorably upon the role 
of religion in public life.168 
To be fair, though, skeptics might suggest that the Court does not re-
ally have in mind the de-incorporation of the Establishment Clause when it 
cultivates deep confusion about taxpayer standing. Were the Court actual-
ly committed to de-incorporating the Establishment Clause, it could just 
declare it to be so, quite clearly and forthrightly, heeding the admonition 
one of i ts own members has often articulated.169 Other alternatives exist: 
the Court could choose to finally bring clarity to taxpayer standing by 
either permitting generalized grievances or f inally overruling Flast alto-
gether.170 Or, according to one scholar, the Court could tell us what is 
really driving its decisions in taxpayer standing cases and elsewhere: find-
ing ways to discourage litigation in federal courts.171 All of these are legit-
imate possibilities. But I suspect the answer is our initial hypothesis—the 
current court is pulling the nation back to the founding design of the Es-
tablishment Clause. 
What does the f uture hold for the Establishment Clause? If it does 
indeed become de-incorporated for all intents and purposes, the conse-
quence will be to return the United States to the state of affairs that gov-
erned at and around the founding, when the Establishment Clause 
constrained only what the national government could do. That development 
would visit a number of changes to the structure of constitutional protec-
tions for religious liberty under the United States Constitution. The most 
obvious change—and perhaps for most observers, also the most troubling 
one—would see states freed to govern matters of religion within 
their respective borders and according to their own state constitutional 
rules. What is more, with the de-incorporation of the Establishment Clause, 
states would no longer be bound by the rule preventing them from passing 
laws establishing a religion. We should of course be worried about the en-
trenchment of this new zero in the relationship between religion and state 
government. But it is not clear that we should consequently fear the disso-
lution of religious rights and liberties. 
 
 168. Stephen A. Newman, From John F. Kennedy’s 1960 Campaign Speech to Christian Suprema-
cy: Religion in Modern Presidential Politics, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 691, 714 (2008). 
 169. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., 
Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 618 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 170. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxation Without Representation, 55 TAX L. REV. 555, 597 (2002). 
 171. See Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
325, 342 (2009). 
